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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CHARLES MOA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070940-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
Rule 11 is not a safe harbor for the State. Nor arc the rights it lists technicalities
A guilty plea involves the waiver of important constitutional rights. Among these rights
is the right to understand the nature and elements of the offense and the factual basis for
the plea. Due process and Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 require that a defendant understand
these rights. If he does not. then his guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary and is,
therefore, void. A long line of Utah cases holds that rule 11 embodies the knowing and
voluntary standard. It lists the full complement of information—including the right to
understand the elements of the offense and the factual basis for the pica- that a trial court
must communicate to a defendant before accepting his plea. Consequently, rule 11 helps
the trial court ensure that the pica is truly knowing and voluntary and produce a complete
record for appeal. 1 he State has identified no good reason to abandon rule 11. Stare
decisis and the need to obtain knowing and voluntary guilty pleas, therefore, dictate that
this Court should use rule 11 when it reviews Moa's guilty plea. Sec infra at Part A.

Whether or not this Court employs rule 11 in this case, it should reverse because
before accepting Moa\s guilty plea, the trial court failed to determine whether Moa
understood the nature and elements of the offense and the factual basis for the plea. The
State concedes that the trial court did not recite all of the elements of the offense during
the pica colloquy. Further, it docs not challenge Moa's claim that the trial court failed to
establish an adequate factual basis during the plea colloquy or Moa's claim that no
documents in the record actually informed him of the elements of the offense or the
factual basis for the plea. Instead, the State asks this Court to assume the trial court
fulfilled its duty. This Court, however, may not assume that the trial court strictly
complied with rule 11. Rather, where there is no evidence in the record to show that Moa
was informed of the elements or the factual basis, this Court should reverse because the
trial court violated rule 11 and the plea was not knowing and voluntary as required by due
process and section 77-13-6. Sec infra at Part B.
Regardless of preservation, this Court should reach the merits of Moa's claim
under the plain error doctrine or ineffective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 29-37:
infra at Part C. Moa docs not respond to the State's other arguments, including its
arguments countering Moa's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by running his
sentences in case no. 4352 consecutive to each other and to case no. 3971. because those
arguments are adequately addressed in the opening brief.

2

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE CASE NO. 3971 BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT ACCEPTED THE GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT
DETERMINING WHETHER MOA UNDERSTOOD THE ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSE OR THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA, AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 11, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6, AND DUE
PROCESS
On appeal, Moa argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, as
required by due process and section 77-13-6, because the trial court failed to determine
whether he understood the nature and elements of the offense or the factual basis for the
plea. When reviewing this claim, this Court should look to rule 11 because it embodies
the knowing and voluntary standard employed by due process and section 77-13-6. See
infra at Part A. Whether or not this Court relics on rule 11 though, it should reverse
Moa's guilty plea because the trial court accepted the pica without determining whether
Moa understood the elements of the offense and the factual basis for the plea. Sec infra
at Part B. Further, regardless of preservation, this Court should reach the merits of this
issue under the plain error doctrine or ineffective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at
29-37; infra at Part C. There was no invited error in this case to prevent this Court from
cmplo) ing the plain error doctrine. Sec infra at Part C.
A.

This Court Should Use Rule 11 To Determine Whether Moa's Guilty Plea
Was Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered, As Required By Due Process and
Section 77-13-6.
Both due process and Utah's statutory law require that a guilty plea must be made

knowingly and voluntarily. Sec, e.g.. Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12,1|20. 203 P.3d 976
("A "guilty plea is not valid under the Due Process Clause of the United States
3

Constitution unless it is knowing and voluntary."* (citations omitted); Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(a) (2008) ("A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.").
Utah and federal case law are clear- a plea is not knowing and voluntary if it is
accepted by the trial court without a showing that the defendant understood the elements
of the offense. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (holding plea
not knowing and voluntary if "defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been
informed of the crime's elements" (citation omitted)); In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, <j|21, 173
P.3d 1279 (holding "absence of a discussion** of nature and elements of offense made
juvenile's admission not "knowing and voluntary*' even though juvenile rule, unlike rule
11, "docs not require the juvenile court judge to ascertain that the juvenile understands
the nature and elements of the offense"); State v. Breckcnridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443-44
(Utah 1983) (ruling plea violated due process where defendant did not understand nature
and elements of offense); see also Aplt. Br. at 20-21 (additional citations).
In addition, a guilty plea "'cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.'*' Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (citation omitted); Nicholls, 2009 UT 12 at ^[20 ("A knowing
and voluntary plea is one that has a factual basis for the plea/*): K.M., 2007 UT 93 at ^[22
(holding due process "requires that the defendant 'possess 11 an understanding of the law
in relation to the facts' for a plea to be knowing and voluntary.**); Breckenridsc, 688 P.2d
at 443-44 (ruling plea violated due process where record failed to contain a factual basis
for the plea); see also Aplt. Br. at 25-26 (additional citations).
4

Rule 11 embodies the knowing and voluntary standard employed by due process
and section 77-13-6. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 Adv. Committee Note (stating that rule 11 is
"'intended to reflect current law without any substantive changes"). It "is designed to
protect an individual's rights when entering a guilty plea 'by ensuring that the defendant
receives full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to
a crime, the consequences of the plea, etc.'" Bluemcl v. State, 2007 UT 90 , *\\\7, 173
P.3d 842; see State v. Beckstcad, 2006 UT 42, ^[10, 140P.3d 1288 ("Rule 11 . . .requires
that guilty pleas be accepted only from defendants who understand the rights they
surrender by pleading guilty and who voluntarily waive those known rights."); State v.
Corwcll. 2005 UT 28. «,|11. 114 P.3d 569 (same).
Rule 11 accomplishes its goal by listing "the detailed inventory of rights that a
defendant will waive if his guilty plea is accepted." Bcckstcad, 2006 UT 42 at €j|10.
These rights are not mere "technicalities]." Aple. Br. at 22. Rather, they represent the
"full complement of information" that a trial court "must communicate to a defendant"
before accepting his guilty plea. Bcckstcad, 2006 UT 42 at •jjlO; see Bluemcl, 2007 UT
90 at ^17 (holding rule 11 "identifies specific rights that a trial court must explain to a
defendant who wishes to plead guilty").
This is particularly true regarding rule 1 Us requirement that a trial court inform
the defendant about the elements of the offense and the factual basis for the plea. Rule
11 (c)(4) states that a trial court may not accept a pica unless it has ensured that the
defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense and that there is a factual
basis sufficient to support the plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4). These sections
5

"reflect[] the exacting demands the law places on those who choose to surrender their
right to make the state prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," K.M., 2007 UT 93
at ip22: sec Boykin. 395 U.S. at 244 (stating trial court properly discharging its duty will
provide a record of the plea adequate for review); United States v. Kamer, 781 P.2d 1380,
1383 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding it is incumbent upon trial court *cto make the minor
investment of time and effort necessary to set forth the meaning of the charges and to
demonstrate on the record that the defendant understands"), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 819
(1986); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) (stating the burden is on the
trial court); Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at ^J 11 (same).
Thus, to determine whether a plea was knowing and voluntary, Utah's appellate
courts routinely ask whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11. Sec, e.g.,
Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at ^|11 (holding rule 11 "governs the entry of guilty pleas"); Aplt.
Br. at 18-20 (additional citations). If the trial court strictly complied with rule 11, this
'"creates a presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered." State v. Martinez, 2001
UT 12, f|[22, 26 P.3d 203 (citation omitted). If, on the other hand, the trial court failed uto
strictly comply with" rule 11, this is "grounds for reversal." Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d
988. 991 n.6 (Utah 1993): see also Bluemcl, 2007 UT 90 at ^|18: Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at
1111; State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372-73 (Utah 1996); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312.
The State claims that rule 11 does not provide a basis for withdrawing a guilty
plea under the knowing and voluntary standard. Aple. Br. at 16-23. The State's
argument relics on Salazar. Sec Aple. Br. at 18. In Salazar, our supreme court held that
"noncompliance with [rule 11 ] is not necessarily a constitutional violation." Salazar, 852
6
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strictly with rule 11 in the taking of guilty picas.'' (citations omitted)).
Although vertical stare decisis makes its unnecessary to reach this issue, accepting
the State's claim is also prohibited by horizontal stare decisis. "|I]n accordance with
horizontal stare decisis, 'the first decision by a court on a particular question of law
governs later decisions by the same court.'" Tcnorio, 2007 UT App 92 at ^|9 (citation
omitted). This Court will only "overrule its own precedent in the limited circumstances
where it is '"clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by
departing from precedent.',,", IcL (citations omitted).
The State only identifies one allegedly changed condition-—in 2003, our
Legislature amended section 77-13-6. IScc Aple. Br. at 18-19, 21-22. Prior to 2003,
section 77-13-6(2)(a) said: "A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2003) Amendment Notes (emphasis added).
Today, it says: "A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it
was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2008).
It is doubtful whether this amendment affects the application of rule 11 at all. This
Court has held that "good cause,'' as the phrase was used before 2003, "'cxist[ed| where
the plea was entered involuntarily.'" State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, f||10. 79 P.3d
960 (citation omitted); see State v. Mendez, 2004 UT App 319. 2004 WL 2065847
(memorandum decision). Further, since the amendment, both this Court and our supreme
court have continued to use rule 11 when reviewing guilty pleas under due process and/or
section 77-13-6. Sec, e.R., BlucmcK 2007 UT 90 at Til 17-18; K.M., 2007 UT 93 at «|21;
8
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information, actually informed Moa of the elements of the offense or established a factual
basis for the plea. See Aplc. Br. at 15-41.
Instead, the State asks this Court to assume that Moa understood the elements of
the offense and the factual basis for the plea because defense counsel discussed the plea
agreement with him; the plea affidavit identified the crime "by name" and ''listed the
specific code provision"; Moa, by signing the affidavit, indicated that "he understood 'the
nature and the elements of crimc(s) to which' he was pleading"; and "the trial court
conducted a thorough rule 11 colloquy with defendant prior to accepting the plea." Aplc.
Br. at 27-30, 39-40 (quoting R. 3971 (76)).
The trial court did not conduct a thorough rule 11 colloquy here because, as the
State concedes, it "did not specifically recite all of the elements of the crime during the
plea hearing" or establish a factual basis for the guilty plea. Aplc. Br. at 29; sec Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(4).
Moreover, Moa's "understanding of the elements of the charge] ] and the
relationship of the law and the facts, may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete
examination." State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations
omitted); sec Thurman, 911 P.2d at 375 (where mental state clement was not clear from
record, "we can hardly assume that it was clear" to defendant at time he entered plea).
In particular, this Court may not "assume that" defense counsel, sometime prior to
the change of plea hearing, made sure that Moa fully understood the elements of the
offense and the factual basis for the plea. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313: see also State v.
Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (same). This case is distinguishable from
10
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to which statute applied, statement that another attorney negotiated the plea, incomplete
recitation of the elements and factual basis during the plea colloquy, and reliance on an
affidavit that provided an incomplete and confused statement of the elements and factual
basis

that Moa understood he was pleading guilty to an element and admitting facts that

were not disclosed anywhere in the plea affidavit, the information, or the plea colloquy.
R. 3971 (226:5-7); sec 3971 (1-3; 75-82).
While the State would have this Court believe that "at some point outside the plea
proceeding, | the defendant) was probably informed of the charge,'' United States v.
Smith, 60 l\3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1995), that is not enough. Where the record is silent or
incomplete, a reviewing court may not assume the trial court fulfilled its duties to ensure
a knowing and voluntary plea. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 243 (stating court will not
presume compliance with Rule 11 from a silent record); Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1123 (stating it
is insufficient for a trial court to rely on ''defense attorneys and plea affidavits'* for plea);
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (stating fcU[i]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty pica""
based on claims of defense counsel, since it is defendant who must be informed of the
plea) (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Blackwell, 199 F.3d 623, 626 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating "an attorney's representation that he explained a charge to the defendant is
not enough to demonstrate that the defendant understood] the nature of that charge");
Smith, 60 F.3d at 598 ("Even if we assume (without deciding) that the judge may
delegate to defense counsel the responsibility to explain the charge, it is necessary that
counsel inform the defendant in open court, so that in reviewing the record we may know
what was said to the defendant.")
12

For similar reasons, this Court may not assume that the guilty plea affidavit
informed Moa of the elements and the factual basis simply because it listed the Code
section of the statute to which Moa pleaded guilty. See Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at ^17
(holding trial court may choose means different than the "particular phrases contained in
rule 11(c)" to inform a defendant of his rights, but modification must serve to ugivef | the
defendant a more concrete and meaningful understanding of his rights").
Because the trial court bears the burden of strict compliance, affidavits and other
documents relied on during a plea colloquy "must be treated as 'only the starting point/"
Lehi, 2003 UT App 212 at 1110 (quoting Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313). "The trial judge
should [still] review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the
defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed
by [rule 11 ] on the record before accepting the guilty plea/'* Id. (alterations in original).
"Furthermore, "T a l n y omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during
the plea hearing/"" L± (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
In Lehi, for example, this Court reversed because the record (including the
information, the plea affidavit, and the plea colloquy) showed that the trial court failed to
clarify the precise elements of the offense. Lehi. 2003 U'l App 212 at ^116. DUI has two
"alternative prongs"- "the 'blood or breath alcohol concentration' prong and the
'incapable of safely operating a vehicle' prong." IcL at ^13 (citation omitted). Although
the information "accurately dcscribcjdj both alternative prongs of the DUI crime," the
plea affidavit referred "only to the 'blood or breath alcohol concentration' prong/' IdL In
contrast, the facts showed the defendant "could have been convicted only under the
13

'incapable of safely operating a vehicle' prong." Id.
Although this Court acknowledged it was "quite possible" that defendant "actually
did understand the nature and elements of the DUI charge," it reversed because "from the
plea record." it could not "conclude that the trial court adequately ensured that Defendant
understood the charge." kf at ^] 14 n.5. 'The trial court was obligated to clarify the| ]
discrepancies during the plea colloquy." Id. at ^16 (citation omitted). "It should have
acknowledged the inconsistency between 1he information and the affidavit, informed
Defendant that the affidavit's description of the DUI elements was inapplicable in his
case, described to Defendant the 'incapable of safely operating a vehicle' prong, and
asked Defendant if he would admit the facts required by that prong." Id. at ^|16.
The due process violation in this case is worse than in Lehi. Here, there is no
evidence Moa was ever informed of the missing elements. S^c R. 3971 (1-3: 75-82;
226). Unlike Lehi, the complete elements were not listed in the information, on the plea
affidavit, or at the plea colloquy. See R. 3971 (1-3: 75-82; 226). Further, as in Lehi, a
''plain reading of the affidavit clearly evidences some confusion regarding the crime."'
Lehi. 2003 UT App 212 at T|14; see R. 3971 (76); Aplt. Br. at 27-29. Although the
affidavit purports to provide the elements and the factual basis, its list of the elements is
incomplete and its presentation of the factual basis is confused—-it omits elements of the
actual offense and lists elements that appear to belong to other, uncharged offenses. Skx
R. 3971 (76): see Aplt. Br. at 27-29.
u

[T|hc purposes and goals of Rule 11 are undermined when the court resorts to

'assumptions/ instead of establishing a record based on defendant's responses to the
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court's questioning," and "there cannot be compliance with Rule 11 where the 'district
judge docs not personally inquire whether the defendant understands] the nature of the
charge."' United States v. Wcttcrlin, 583 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1978) (assessing
whether lay person should be expected to understand charge of conspiracy involving the
mail and a scheme to defraud) (citation omitted)), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979).
In this case, the trial court "should not have assumed that [MoaJ already knew and
understood what the charges were, but rather the court should have assumed he was
ignorant of the charges and thus used the hearing to inform |Moa| "of some aspects of
legal argot and other legal concepts that arc esoteric to an accused/" Id. (citation
omitted).
C.

Regardless of Preservation, This Court Should Reach the Merits of Moa's
Claim that His Plea Was Not Knowing and Voluntary.
1 his Court should reach the merits of Moa's claim and reverse because Moa has

demonstrated that the trial court's error was plain and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 29-37.
Regarding Moa's plain error argument, defense counsel did not invite the trial
court's error. See, e.g.. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f,fl| 16-24, 164 P.3d 366 (explaining
invited error doctrine). The trial court's error occurred at the change of plea hearing,
when it accepted Moa's guilty plea without first finding that he understood the elements
of the offense and the law in relation to the facts. See Aplt. Br. at 29-33. As explained in
Moa's opening brief, the trial court bore a duty of strict compliance at the change of plea
hearing. Sec Aplt. Br. at 18-20. Although it could partially rely on documents properly
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incorporated into the record and representations made by the attorneys, it alone was
charged with ensuring Moa's plea was knowing and voluntary. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28
at Iffll 1-12; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372-73. The trial court's
failure to strictly comply with its duty may not be excused by defense counsel's actions,
particularly where defense counsel presented elements and a factual basis that were
obviously incomplete and confused. See State v. Abcyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)
(holding "strict compliance" standard requires court to "personally establish" that
"defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary'* and that "defendant knowingly
waived his or her constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime"); State
v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f||19, 69 P.3d 838 (stating that filings may promote efficiency
during the plea colloquy; and they must be addressed at and incorporated into the plea
hearing on the record); State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18 & n.2 (Utah 1991)
(requiring transcripts and filings to be properly incorporated into the pica record).
Besides, the statements identified by the State as evidence of invited error were
not made during the change of plea hearing. See Aple. Br. at 23-25. Rather, they were
made later, in the context of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. See Aple. Br. at 2325; cfi Pratt. 2007 UT 41 at f||23 (holding party did not invite error by filing "an untimely
responsive memorandum concerning an issue in the case'* because "invited error
generally occurs in a more affirmative manner**). To the extent that third confiiet counsel
did not investigate the nature and elements of the offense or the factual basis and,
therefore, did not rcali/e that the elements and factual basis listed on the affidavit were
incomplete and inaccurate, he provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Sec Aplt. Br. at
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33-37. This is grounds for reversal. See id. But it is not a reason to excuse the trial
court's plain error in accepting a guilty plea that was not knowingly and voluntarily
entered as required by due process, section 77-13-6, and rule 11. See Breckenridge, 688
P.2d at 443 (reaching unpreserved argument that defendant's "right to due process was
violated" when court accepted his plea without his understanding the elements and
without a showing of a factual basis); Mills, 898 P.2d at 823-24 (looking to the record at
the time of the plea; and ruling that, among other things, defendant was not "informed of
the elements of criminal attempt" for the charges).
Besides, there is case law to support the idea that this Court should reach the
merits of Moa's claim without ever addressing plain error or ineffective assistance. A
plea that is entered without a showing that the defendant understood the elements of the
offense and the factual basis for the plea violates "'due process and is therefore void.'"
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n. 5 (citation omitted); see Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182-83
(stating a plea is invalid if defendant is not aware of the nature of the charges including
the elements); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (stating a guilty plea
"is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge" and cannot be voluntary
unless defendant understands "the law in relation to the facts").

:

In Breckenridge, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, but did not argue "that his right to due process was violated because his guilty
plea was accepted by the court without his understanding the nature and elements of [the
offense] and without a showing that there was any factual basis upon which to base
conviction of a crime" until oral argument. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443. Despite the
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defendant's failure to preserve the issue, our supreme court still reached it because the
defendant's "felony conviction and sentence restfedj on the outcome of his appeal." Id
'The general rule that constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is
excepted to when a person's liberty is at stake." Id. (citation omitted). Further:
We have recognized the importance of avoiding a guilty plea wrongly made
because of ignorance. "The court has an undoubted duty to guard against
the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged may be
induced to plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nature of the
charge or the consequences of his plea . . . ." State v. Harris. Utah, 585
P.2d 450, 452 (1978). Furthermore, Utah R. Crirn. P. 11(e)(4) specifically
states that "[l]he court. . . shall not accept. . a plea [of guilty] until the
court has made the findings: . . . (4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea."
Id.; but see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 924-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
Utah's appellate courts have not universally followed Breckenridge).
There is no difficulty addressing a due process claim for the first time on appeal
because this Court will assess the voluntariness of the plea based on the record of
proceedings. See, e.g.. Boykin. 395 U.S. at 244 (stating that trial court discharging its
duty provides "a record adequate for any review that may be later sought"); Maguirc, 830
P.2d at 217-18 & n.2 (stating compliance with Rule 11 "may be demonstrated on appeal
by reference to the record of the plea proceedings"); Ho IT, 814 P.2d at 1122 (requiring
plea judge to personally establish on the record that defendant "understood the elements
of the crime"); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (requiring trial court to comply with Rule
11(c) "when a guilty plea is entered").
Thus, this Court should reach the merits of the issue under the plain error doctrine
or ineffective assistance of counsel or, as our supreme court did in Breckenridge, because
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it is a constitutional issue and Moa's liberty is at stake. See Aplt. Br. at 29-37.
CONCLUSION
In case no. 3971, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Moa's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. It should then impose a conviction for discharging a
firearm, a class B misdemeanor, or remand with an order allowing Moa to withdraw his
guilty plea. In case no. 4352, this Court should remand for resentencing.
SUBMITTED this _ G _ day of May, 2009.

ig^u~ O ^ k ^ a A ,

LORI J. SFJPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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